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Abstract
This paper studies the optimal insurance contract between a state and the cen-
tral government in a federal economy with moral hazard, risk of repudiation (given
some enforceability technology) and aggregate uncertainty. Also, it considers date 0
negotiation costs to implement this contract. The distribution of the …scal resources
locally collected by the province at t +1 are a¤ected by period t state’s e¤ort to collect
taxes. Also, every period a state has the right to get a …xed proportion of the taxes
nationally collected by the central government. These resources are identically and
independently distributed across time. Using a recursive formulation of the allocation
problem (following Atkeson (1991)), some basic properties of the optimal insurance
contract are discussed showing when, in particular, it is actually optimal just to give
up any attempt to provide insurance to the province.
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1 Introduction
For di¤erent reasons, it is sometimes claimed that the optimal transfer mechanism embodied
in the federal system should be such that the state or province or region can get some
insurance from the central government or authority. For example, the Maastricht Treaty
for European Monetary Union (EMU) entails a huge loss of monetary policy autonomy for
individual countries and only limited scope for borrowing against regional shocks. Some
observers have claimed that a successful EMU requires some risk sharing scheme at the
community level (Persson and Tabellini [6]). In federal countries, moreover, there is some
evidence that the federal system has been trying to ful…ll this purpose at least partially. For
the United States of America, Asdrubali et al. [1] presents evidence to quantify the amount
of risk sharing across states …nding that 13 percent of the shocks to gross state product are
smoothed by the federal government1 . On the other hand, in Europe the federal system
provides virtually no risk-sharing. Del Negro [4] checks that these results are robust with
respect to changes in both the data and the methodology.
In some Latin American countries this issue is even more complex since the federal system
is also required to provide incentives to the states to create strong institutions to collect more
local taxes. This is mainly because regional governments …nance a high proportion of their
spending with resources transferred from the central government. As a matter of fact, public
1 They actually descompose the federal government smoothing. They …nd that federal grants to states
smooth 2.5 percent of shocks to gross state product, which is small compared with the smoothing through
the federal tax-transfer system, and that unemployment insurance smoothes 1.7 percent.
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sector decentralization is under discussion to determine the optimal degree of this kind of
institutional reform2 which makes the provision of those incentives a natural initial step.
Mainly for technological reasons, in a federal economy central governments use to collect
taxes all over the country and then , given some previously de…ned property rights, each
state or province gets its part. States also collect their own taxes. In this situation, it is
important to determine which is the optimal mechanism through which …scal resources are
given back from the central government to the states. To do this, we need to discuss and
justify how the information is shared all over the economy and which are all the technological
aspects involved in the contract. Since these …scal resources are in general random, under the
assumption of perfect information, the state should be able of smoothing its consumption of
the public good getting complete insurance from the CG or, more in general, international
competitive markets.
Now a state has information that is hardly observable for the central government. In
particular, the e¤ort level made by the state to locally collect taxes is part of it and it is
crucial to determine to optimal transfer mechanism. Also, the degree of enforceability of any
contract signed by the CG and a state is actually incomplete: it is hard to imagine that a
determined state will remain within the contract no matter what.
However, the characterization of the optimal transfer mechanism which provides insur-
ance might be obscured by some facts. In particular, the empirical evidence shows that this
mechanism has also been used to redistribute resources through regions, which is clearly
2 Some evidence shows that Latin American countries had a more decentralized …scal structure in 1995 than
in they had had in 1985. See Sanguinetti and Tomassi [8] for a discusion of this issue and references.
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a very di¤erent objective from that concerning with optimally giving back resources in a
federal economy to provide some kind of insurance. Even though redistribution aspects in-
volved in this kind of contracts are very important3 , this paper will purposely abstract from
redistributive issues to concentrate on the risk sharing aspects.
Following Atkeson [2] in his seminal paper on international borrowing and lending, we
will use some recent results on e¢cient allocations in information constrained economies
with incomplete degree of enforceability to analyze the optimal properties the best mech-
anism should have when date 0 negotiation costs are present. Thus it will be examined
the constrained optimal insurance contract from the central government to the state in an
environment in which there are mainly three impediments to forming contracts. The …rst
one arises from the assumption that the CG cannot observe whether states invest or con-
sume its funds. Di¤erent levels of state’s public investment will generate di¤erent probability
distributions for the next period’s locally collected taxes. Here, public investment should
be interpreted very generally (as, for example, Persson and Tabellini [6,7]): it is re‡ecting
resources devoted to improve the technology concerning the collection of taxes in a given
state. This assumption leads to a moral hazard problem in investment. The second imped-
iment arises from the assumption that the state (”the borrower”), as a relatively free state
in a federal economy, may choose to repudiate his debt (”risk of repudiation”) at some cost
given that the enforceability technology available in this economy is not perfect; this is what
we call incomplete degree of enforceability. Finally, the implementation of any insurance
contract di¤erent from autarky is costly, representing the fact that new institutions must be
3 For a recent discussion of this issue, see Persson and Tabellini [7].
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created.
This note will then proceed with the following logic. First we will specify the charac-
teristics the optimal contract should have if full observability, complete enforceability and
costless contracts were feasible. Then, once the main aspects involved in the relationship
between the CG and the state have been discussed, it is very important from the theoretical
point of view, and as a …rst step, to specify the objective and the constraints the problem-
solver has to face. Thus, when the relevant allocation problem has been stated, it will be
analyzed the optimal contract between the central government and the state and its prop-
erties, whenever it is possible to characterize them. It will be shown that there are cases
where no insurance is actually optimal when the negotiation process is considered. Roughly
speaking, when constructing the optimal transfer mechanism, the central government needs
to generate incentives to have the state make determined levels of e¤ort (given the aggregate
state in the economy re‡ected for both income shocks). It may be the case that when a
low level of locally collected resources is observed, and independently of the realization of
nationally collected taxes, the payo¤ for the state when remaining within the contract is low
to provide these incentives and so, when negotiated at date 0, the state would prefer not to
get any insurance from the central government just to avoid ”paying” that ex-ante insurance
cost. Therefore, certain speci…c bounds to these costs will be found for same cases. We
will also establish informally why it seems possible situations where there are incentives to
renegotiate.
These arguments could then be useful to justify the fact that maybe the best institutional
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and political solution is just to give back the …scal resources without trying to smooth state’s
consumption, and so the state will solve its ”autarky” problem. There, a state takes its …scal
resources and maximizes some objective function. Motivated by plausibility and simplicity,
we will assume that the state has no access to any additional credit market.
It should be emphasized that this note is a theoretical exercise formalizing simple ideas.
It attempts to be useful in the policy analysis to get insights about some problems arising
when a federal system is trying to be implemented.
Before presenting the model economy, some related literature must be mentioned. In
a static set up, Persson and Tabellini [6] studies policy outcomes under di¤erent federal
institutional arrangements (vertically and horinzontally ordered) where collectively chosen
…scal policy shares risks between individuals and between regions, and alters the probability
distribution of aggregate shocks4 . Ex ante public investment is unobservable and it can
positively a¤ect the distribution of regional income (investing more resources makes the good
state more likely). Agents are arbitrarily not able of getting insurance with respect to their
types (idiosyncratic probabilities of getting a job o¤er). However, regional governments can
implement an unemployment insurance program which is chosen through majority rule and,
4 See also their companion paper, Persson and Tabellini [7] where they study the political and economic de-
terminants of interregional public transfers. It focuses on how much transfers are shaped by alternative …scal
constitutions, where a constitution is an allocation of …scal instruments across di¤erent levels of governments
plus a procedure for the collective choice of these …scal instruments. Thus restrictions on …scal instruments
introduce a trade-o¤ between risk sharing and redistribution where di¤erent constitutions produce di¤erent
results. A federal social insurance scheme, chosen by voting, provides overinsurance, whereas an intergov-
ernmental transfer scheme, chosen by bargaining, provides underinsurance. As they specify, this analysis is
purely positive since they arbitrarily impose the relevant instruments. The present paper is however purely
normative since we will analyze the properties of the optimal transfer mechanism, given preferences, tech-
nologies and property rights but it does not discuss issues related to redistribution across states(in particular,
it takes as given the proportion of …scal resources coming from nationally collected taxes corresponding to
the state).
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given their assumptions, it is found optimal to support full social insurance. When analyzing
risk sharing across regions, two alternative institutional arrangements are related to this
paper. In one of them, regional policies (the unemployment insurance program and the level
of public regional investment) and the national policies (the aggregate risk-sharing contract
across regions) are voted simultaneously. Here, aggregate risk sharing can exacerbate the
moral hazard problem: the more regions are insured, the smaller their incentive to invest.
As in the present paper, there is thus a trade-o¤ between risk sharing and moral hazard
In the second arrangement, the federal policy is voted prior to the regional policy. Here,
the resulting political equilibrium entails a more favorable trade-o¤ between risk sharing
and moral hazard where a second best allocation can be implemented. In our paper, the
contract considered to share risk is the optimal one with no additional restrictions imposed
in advanced (for example, transfers between the central government and the state will be
contingent to the aggregate state of the economy; this is not the case in their paper). Also,
in the present paper we will additionally consider a dynamic environment with incomplete
degree of enforceability.
Sanguinetti and Tomassi [8] studies two alternative regimes where idiosyncratic shocks to
regions are private information. In one regime, the central government commits to a certain
level of transfers to compensate vertical …scal imbalances and so provide some limited ex-
ante insurance (by increasing the expected value of local consumption, which is subject
to stochastic shocks). In the other regime, it accommodates ex-post the …scal needs of
the di¤erent provinces, after the local government has made its choices. In this second
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case, full-insurance results, but the economy is subject to a tragedy of the …scal commons,
with excessive regional spending and reduced production of federal public goods (such as
macroeconomic stability).
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the economy, speci…es basic
de…nitions and discuss the de…nition of a constrained e¢cient allocation. It also includes a
characterization of the costless, fully observable and completely enforceable contract if the
state has access to perfect international credit markets. Section 3 discusses a recursive
formulation of this problem and presents some basic properties of the optimal contract
discussing situations where no insurance is actually an e¢cient outcome. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model Economy
As mentioned in the introduction, we use a modi…ed version of the model introduced by
Atkenson [2]. There is a state representing an in…nitely-lived, risk-averse agent, whom we
call simply the state (S)5 . The state’s consumption of the public good in period t is denoted
gt. In addition, there is an in…nitely-lived risk-neutral central government, denoted CG.
Time is discrete and denoted by t = 0; 1; 2; :::.The state has a stochastic technology to
locally collect taxes. Increased investment by the state makes good realizations more likely.
We interpret this such that increased ”e¤ort” by the state (represented by investment in
terms of the public good) increases the probabilities of getting large amounts of state’s …scal
resources. Moral hazard will constrain contracts between the state and CG because it is
5 The local government’s preferences, in trivial application of the median voter theorem, coincide with that
of the representative agent. However, the agent not necessarily consumes only this public good; they may
have been chosen their optimal contingent bundles of private goods given fgtg and some taxation policy.
The strong assumption will appear when imposing conditions to the shape of u(:):
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assumed that the state’s consumption of the single (public) good and the level of its (public)
investment are indeed unobservable. So given state’s investment in units of goods at time
t (It), the state’s investment opportunity yields as next period state’s …scal resources the
random variable Yt+1 which takes values in the …nite set - = (Y1; :::; YN); where Yi > Yj
if i > j: Denote f(Yt+1; It) the probability distribution of Yt+1 given It and assume that f
is continuous with respect to It (and so measurable):We assume that f (Yt+1; It) > 0 such
that the CG cannot infer any state’s e¤ort level from the realization of Y . Note that we
can interpret that Yt+1 is just a …xed proportion of the state’s total output when the state’s
taxation policy is taken as given. Note also that we are assuming that this …scal income is
not depending on any central government’s activity.
The CG is endowed with a random large quantity of …scal resources fµtg of the same
good which is identically and independently distributed through time and independent with
respect to Yt:We assume that µt takes values in the …nite set£ = fµ1; :::; µJg; with probability
distribution ¼ and µi > µj if i > j . Let µ =
PJ
j=1 ¼(µj)µj: Assume that a …xed fraction ® of
µt is transferred every period to the state. The decision of this last proportion is assumed
to have been decided in some previous (political) process and it is taken as given. Note that
this (random) income for the state is representing aggregate uncertainty.
We now separate the total amount of transferred funds to the state in period t in two
contingent components: one representing the repayment from the state to the CG given that
the state has received a transfer from the CG in period t¡ 1, represented by dt; the second
one representing a new gross transfer, represented by bt. Thus, the net transfer to the state
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in period t is given by bt ¡ dt, which is representing the negative CG’s consumption net of
endowment (1¡ ®)µt. That is, CG’s consumption at date t is given by (1¡ ®)µt ¡ bt + dt;
which must be nonnegative.
Given that fµtg is assumed to be exogenously given, an allocation in this environment is
de…ned to be a plan which speci…es current consumption of the state, current net transferred
funds and investment in the tax-collecting technology. Given that fgt; Itg are unobservable,
the plan may depend on the entire observable history of realization of …scal resources. Hence,
we choose Qt = Yt ¡ dt and µt as the state variables and write xt = (x0; :::; xt) to represent
the partial history up to date t. Thus, an allocation is represented by the stochastic process
¾ = fgt(Qt; µt); bt(Qt; µt); It(Qt; µt); dt+1(Yt+1; µt+1;Qt; µt)g1t=0
with initial conditions Y0; µ0 and d0. As usual we will assume that d0 = 0 (i.e. the state
starts negotiating with CG about the optimal transfer mechanism having no initial debt).
De…nition 1 An allocation is feasible if for all t; for all (Yt; µt) and for all (Y t; µt)
(1) gt(Q
t; µt) ¡ [bt(Qt; µt) ¡ dt(Yt; µt;Qt¡1; µt¡1)] + It(Qt; µt)  Yt +®µt
where gt(Qt; µt); It(Qt; µt) ¸ 0
and bt(Qt; µ
t)¡ dt(Yt; µt;Qt¡1; µt¡1)  (1 ¡®)µt
Let us impose two additional assumptions about the CG. First, the CG binds itself to
carry out the terms of a contract only it is getting, in expected value, at least 0 in every
two-period contracts. We can interpret this assumption just like being an institutional rule
imposed to the CG through some previous political decision6 . Second, we assume that when
6 We impose this assumption to re‡ect the fact that the CG is more impatient than that represented by the
discount factor.
9
A Note On Optimal Insurance in an Information Constrained Federal Economy with
Incomplete Degree of Enforceability and Negotiation Costs
the CG has su¤ered a repudiation to its transfer contract it may costlessly seize any positive
transfer the state might have to receive in the future as compensation towards its loss and
also it can take away a technologically given fraction (1¡) of the nationally collected …scal
resource corresponding to the state at that date. The parameter  represents one side of the
degree of enforceability in this economy.
Preferences
State’s preferences over allocations are represented by a utility function denoted by
US(¾) = (1¡ ¯)E¾0f
1X
t=0
¯tu(gt(Q
t; µt))g
That is, the household represented by the state has preferences represented by a time
separable, expected, discounted utility function (where ¯ 2 (0; 1)). We assume that the
momentary utility function satis…es: (i) u is bounded above by u; (ii) u0 > 0; u0(0) =
1 and u00 < 0. E¾0 denotes the conditional expectation on the information available at time
07.
The CG has preferences represented by the expected discounted value of its consumption
UCG(¾) = E¾0f
1X
t=0
¯t[(1¡ ®)µt ¡ bt(Qt; µt) + dt(Yt; µt;Qt¡1; µt¡1)]g
=
(1¡ ®)µ
(1 ¡¯) ¡ E
¾
0f
1X
t=0
¯t[bt(Q
t; µt)¡ dt(Yt; µt;Qt¡1; µt¡1)]g
Therefore, since a¢ne transformations of UCG(¾) will represent the same CG’s preference
7 Expectations are taken with respect to the probability measure induced by the allocation and the given
probability distribution ¼: Note that, given an allocation, It(Qt; µ
t) and ¼ determine a unique probability
measure ¹ on the ¾-…eld generated by the stochastic process fQt ; µtg:
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ordering, we can write
UCG(¾) = ¡E¾0f
1X
t=0
¯t[bt(Q
t; µt) ¡ dt(Yt; µt;Qt¡1; µt¡1)]g
We con…ne ourselves to examining allocations which are both feasible and which provide
both governments with at least as much utility as could be obtained by not negotiating at
all, since participation in the contract is voluntary. The reservation utility of the CG in this
environment is zero. The reservation utility of the state is the expected utility it can get
refusing all kind of transfers and consuming and investing in the storage technology on its
own while every period the state gets from the central government the random income ®µt.
Thus, this can be gotten as the solution to the following dynamic programming problem8 :
U Saut(Y; µ) = max
I2[0;Y+®µ]
f(1¡ ¯)u(Y + ®µ¡ I) + ¯
X
Y 0;µ0
U Saut(Y
0; µ0)f(Y 0; I)¼(µ0)g
Note that, since u is strictly increasing, it follows by standard arguments USaut is strictly
increasing in both arguments.
Assumption 1:
(1¡ ¯)u(0) + ¯u < Uaut(Y1; µ1)
This condition ensures that there are levels of current consumption so low that the state
prefers the autarky allocation to an allocation which speci…es these low levels of current
consumption, regardless of what levels of consumption were to be o¤ered in the future by
the contract.
8 Note that this dynamic programming problem has a well-de…ned solution; see Stokey, Lucas with Prescott
[9].
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Assumption 29 : The distribution of the state’s …scal resources given investment, f(Y;I),
is given by the convex combination of two underlying distributions f 0(Y) and f 1(Y) as fol-
lows:
f(Y ; I) = ¸(I)f0(Y ) + (1 ¡ ¸(I))f1(Y )
with f0(Yi)=f1(Yi) monotone increasing in i, ¸(I) 2 [0; 1], ¸0(I) > 0; and ¸00(I)  0 for
all I . Note @f (Y ;I)@I = fI(Y ; I) = ¸
0(I)[f0(Y )¡ f1(Y )]:
Note that after (Qt; µt) has been realized, the continuation value of a given allocation is
represented by
US(¾=Qt; µt) = (1 ¡ ¯)u(gt(Qt; µt)) +E¾t f
1X
s=1
¯t+su(gt+s(Q
t+s; µt+s))=Qt; µtg
where as usual E¾t f:::=Qt; µtgis the conditional expectation (given the ¾-algebra generated
by (Qt; µt)10 ).
Negotiation Costs
We introduce the assumption that the negotiation process has a cost in terms of state’s
current …scal income in period 0. Suppose that this is represented by
!0(¾) = f0 if ¾ is the autarky allocation
! > 0 otherwise
This is representing the fact that negotiating something di¤erent from just the devolution
of the state’s …scal resources has additional costs (which may be very large). We should
interpret these costs very generally: they are representing the costs of creating all the new
9 This assumption justi…es the use of the …rst order conditions.
10See Billingsley [3], chapter 34, for details.
12
A Note On Optimal Insurance in an Information Constrained Federal Economy with
Incomplete Degree of Enforceability and Negotiation Costs
institutions to implement the optimal contract (to provide, for example, an additional degree
of commitment). Note that the de…nition of feasibility in period 0 depends upon which is
the relation between the CG and the state. This dependence is obvious. Note also that
negotiation costs are paid just in period 0.
We will assume that the CG will provide as much insurance to the state as possible but,
when considering the date 0 participation constraint, it will not try to provide expected
utility such that the state is better o¤ within the contract after paying these negotiation
costs by itself. CG will just provide expected utility such that the state is better than the
autarky level, without considering these additional costs.
De…nition 2 A feasible allocation ¾ is individually rational if for all t and for all (Qt; µt)
(2) US(¾=Qt; µt) ¸ USaut(Qt; µt) and UCG(¾) ¸ 0
Moreover, a feasible allocation ¾ satis…es the institutional rule if for all t and for all
(Qt; µt)
(20) ¡ bt(Qt; µt) + ¯
X
Q0 ;µ0
dt+1(Y
0; µ0;Qt; µt)f (Y 0; It(Qt; µt)¼(µ0) ¸ 0
Note that the individual rationality constraint for the CG holds when the institutional
rule is satis…ed . To see this, note that
¡bt(Qt; µt) + ¯
X
Q0;µ0
dt+1(Y
0; µ0;Qt;µt)f(Y 0; It(Qt; µt))¼(µ0)
= E¾t f¡bt + ¯dt+1=(Qt; µt)g
almost surely since dt+1(Y 0; µ0;Qt; µt)f (Y 0; It(Qt; µt)) and bt(Qt; µt) are (Qt; µt)-measurable
and applying conditional expectation to the second term. Thus, by de…nition of conditional
expectation,
E¾0f¡bt(Qt; µt) + ¯
X
Q0;µ0
dt+1(Y
0; µ0;Qt; µt)f(Y 0; It(Qt; µt))¼(µ0)g
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= E¾0f¡bt + ¯dt+1g
Therefore, if the institutional constraint is satis…ed, since previous equality holds for every
t; reordering in the obvious way the individual rationality constraint for the CG, we get that
the last one will hold.
2.1 Costless E¢cient Contracts with Perfect Enforceability and
Full Observability
Before analyzing the constrained e¢cient contract (given the problems of moral hazard and
the risk of repudiation generated by the incomplete degree of enforceability), we will discuss
the contract emerging if costless, perfectly enforceable and fully observable contracts were
feasible.
Suppose then that the state can issue Arrow securities and that there is a large number
of risk-neutral lenders. Let a(Y 0; µ0) be the number of Arrow securities issued by the sate for
the next period’s realization (Y 0; µ0); let p(Y 0; µ0) be the price of this security. With a large
number of risk-neutral lender, it is well-known that p(Y 0; µ0) = ¯¼(µ0)fI(Y 0; I ) given some
level of state’s investment (”e¤ort”) I. Let v(w) be the state’s value function given a level
of state’s current …scal resources equal to w. It can be shown by standard arguments that
v(w) is bounded, strictly increasing, strictly concave and continuously di¤erentiable. Note
that given (Y; µ) we have that w = Y + a(Y; µ) + ®µ: The state’s allocation problem can be
shown to have the following Bellman equation representation:
v(w) = max
I;fa(Y 0 ;µ0)g
ff(1¡ ¯)u(w ¡ X
(Y 0 ;µ0)
p(Y 0; µ0)a(Y 0; µ0)¡ I ) + ¯ X
Y 0 ;µ0
v(w0)f (Y 0; I)¼(µ0)g
subject to [w¡P(Y 0 ;µ0) p(Y 0; µ0)a(Y 0; µ0)¡I] ¸ 0 and I ¸ 0; where w0 = Y 0+a(Y 0; µ0)+®µ0
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First order conditions for interior solutions are given by
a(Y 0; µ0) : (1¡ ¯)u0(c)p(Y 0; µ0) = ¯v0(Y 0 + a(Y 0; µ0) + ®µ0)f(Y 0; I )¼(µ0)
I : (1¡ ¯)u0(c) = ¯ X
Y 0;µ0
v(Y 0 + a(Y 0; µ0) + ®µ0)fI (Y 0; I)¼(µ0)
The envelope condition is given by
v0(w) = (1 ¡ ¯)u0(c)
Notice that from the …rst F.O.C., the asset pricing formula previously described and the
envelope condition, we get that
u0(c) = u0(c0)
and so c = c0. Therefore consumption is completely smoothed through time and di¤erent
realizations of (Y 0; µ0). But then since v is strictly decreasing, it follows form the envelope
condition and the fact that consumption is completely smoothed that Y + a(Y; µ) + ®µ =
Y 0 + a(Y 0; µ0) + ®µ0 = w for all (Y; µ) and all (Y 0; µ0): Thus a(Y 0; µ0) = w ¡ Y 0 ¡ ®µ0for all
(Y 0; µ0): Finally, notice that investment is also constant through time and di¤erent realizations
of (Y 0; µ0): Note how this a¤ects the determination of the Arrow securities’ prices.
This outcome with full insurance is the usual solution with complete observability and
perfect enforceability. Now we will consider the case where these two properties are missed.
2.2 The Constrained E¢cient Contract
We de…ne the constraints on the set of allocations that are imposed by the problems of moral
hazard and the risk of repudiation generated by the incomplete degree of enforceability. Then
we set up the problem of …nding the constrained e¢cient transfers.
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To de…ne the set of allocations which are free from the risk of repudiation, we must
describe the set of punishments that the CG can impose upon the state for repudiation.
CG can punish the state for repudiation by refusing it further positive transfers and also
by taking away an additional fraction (1 ¡) of the nationally collected resources at date
t. The technological parameter , taken as given, is representing the fact that the degree of
enforceability is incomplete in this economy11 . Thus if the state …nds optimal to repudiate
any negative transfer at date t, the worst punishment that the CG can impose upon the
state who repudiates a negative transfer at some period is the state’s autarky utility after
having substructed (1¡) from the nationally collected taxes going to the state12 .
De…nition 3 An allocation ¾ is immune from the threat of repudiation if for all t ¸ 0
and for all Y 0 and µ0, the continuation allocation after the realizations of …scal resources from
the storage technology and those nationally collected, satis…es:
(3) US(¾=Qt; µt; Y 0; µ0) ¸ USaut(Y 0; µ0)
An allocation ¾ is incentive compatible if for all feasible allocation b¾ = fbgt(); bIt(); bt(); dt+1()g
(with the components fbtg and fdt+1g unchanged):
(4) US(¾) ¸ US(¾ 0)
Condition (3) is the ex-post participation constraint; thus the state must …nd optimal to
continue within the contract next period when considering U Saut(Y
0; µ0) as its ex-post reser-
vation value. The relevant reservation value for the CG is that imposed by the institutional
rule discussed above. We will then examine self-enforcing contracts where neither party ever
has an incentive to renege.
11As it will be discussed below, it is very important that  is taken as given and not decided in some political
process at date 0.
12This concept is also used in Espino (1999) in a closely related economy.
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Condition (4) says that an allocation is incentive compatible if the state gets more utility
from carrying out the contingent consumption and investment plans speci…ed in the alloca-
tion than from considering any other consumption and investment plan whenever it takes
the lending and repayment plans speci…ed as given.
Now we are ready to state the insurance problem the CG will solve. We will assume the
extreme case where it will provide as much insurance to the state as possible without taking
into account date 0 negotiation costs paid by the state.
Note that we assuming away the possibility that the CG repudiates any contract.
De…nition 4 An allocation ¾¤ is Constrained E¢cient if it maximizes US(¾) subject
to the constraints of (1) feasibility, (2) individual rationality and the institutional rule, (3)
immunity from the threat of repudiation, and (4) incentive compatibility.
The di¢cult part of solving this program is understanding how to handle the incentive
compatibility constraint. If positive level investment is speci…ed in an allocation with full
insurance, it will not be incentive compatible: as we have shown before, state’s level of …scal
resource would be constant and since investment is unobservable the state will invest nothing
(i.e. it will make no ”collecting e¤ort”).
We will proceed as follows. First we solve the programming problem assuming no ne-
gotiation costs and then we will analyze the problem in the …rst period (where these costs
are assumed to be ”paid” by the state). Thus, we do not consider the date 0 participation
constraint for the state taking into account negotiation costs What we are doing is just
computing the expected utility the state would get following the optimal partial insurance
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contract and then check the participation constraint for period 0. Note that, even though
when computing ¾¤ we will have that U S(¾¤) ¸ U Saut(Y0; µ0), it does not necessarily follow
that US(¾¤) ¸ U Saut(Y0 ¡ !; µ0): In that case, ¾¤ is actually ¾aut:
3 Recursive Formulation and Some Properties of the
Constrained E¢cient Contract
De…ne, for each value of (Q; µ), the state’s utility possibility correspondence (that is, the
levels of state’s expect utility that can be achieved when moral hazard and incomplete
enforceability are taking into account) as
V (Q; µ) = fUS(¾) : ¾ satis…es (1)-(4) and (Q0; µ0) = (Q; µ)g
The correspondence V is not empty valued since USaut(Q; µ) 2 V (Q; µ) for all (Q; µ) and
bounded (from below by 0 and from above by u < 1). Now, let W be any correspondence
de…ned over domain Q££, withW (Q; µ) non-empty and uniformly bounded for all values in
the domain. De…ne a set of current controls to be the vector A = (g; I; b; d0) where g, b and
I are scalars and d0 : Y ££!R. De…ne a function U to be a continuation value function
if it is a selection from the correspondence W ; i.e. U : Q££!R, with U (Q; µ) 2W (Q; µ)
for all values of (Q; µ).
De…nition 5 The pair (A;U) of current controls and continuation value function, is admis-
sible with respect to W at (Q; µ) if it satis…es the following conditions:
(10) g¡ b + I  Q+®µ
where g; I ¸ 0 and b¡ d  (1¡ ®)µ
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(20)
(1 ¡ ¯)u(Q+ ®µ + b¡ I) + ¯ X
Y 0 ;µ0
U (Y 0 ¡ d0(Y 0; µ0); µ0)f(Y 0; I )¼(µ0) ¸ USaut(Q; µ)
¡b+ ¯ X
Q0;µ0
d0(Y 0; µ0)f(Y 0; I)¼(µ0) ¸ 0
Also, for all (Y 0; µ0)
U(Y 0 ¡ d0(Y 0; µ0); µ0) ¸ USaut(Y 0; µ0)
I 2arg maxeI (1 ¡ ¯)u(Q+ ®µ + b¡ eI) + ¯
X
Y 0;µ0
U (Y 0 ¡ d0(Y 0; µ0); µ0)f (Y 0; eI)¼(µ0)
Denote the payo¤ to the state generated by a pair (A;U) by
E [(A;U)(Q; µ)] = (1¡ ¯)u(Q+®µ + b ¡ I) + ¯ X
Y 0 ;µ0
U(Y 0 ¡ d0(Y 0; µ0); µ0)f(Y 0; I)¼(µ0)
Denote
B(W )(Q; µ) = fE(A;U )(Q; µ) : (A;U) is admissible with respect to W at (Q; µ)g
Result 1: V (Q; µ) = B(V )(Q; µ) for all (Q; µ).
Proof. It follows, after some manipulations13 , by proposition 1 and 2 given by Atkeson
(1991).
De…ne the value of the optimal contract as a function of the state variables:
v(Q; µ) = supfv : v 2 V (Q; µ)g
Hence, it follows from Result 1 that v(Q; µ) is characterized by the program:
(P) v(Q; µ) =sup
A;U
f(1¡ ¯)u(Q+®µ + b ¡ I) + ¯ X
Y 0 ;µ0
U(Y 0 ¡ d0(Y 0; µ0); µ0)f (Y 0; I)¼(µ0)g
13Details are available upon request to the author.
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subject to the constraint that (A;U) be admissible with respect to V at (Q; µ) = (Q0; µ0)14.
It can be shown that V has a compact graph (and so there exists an optimal contract),
that the correspondence I¤ de…ned by (4) is single valued, that the correspondence V is
continuous and that (under some additional assumptions) the function v is continuous.
Result 2: Assume that the value function v is continuous. Then the continuation value
function bU which solves the program (P) necessarily satis…es bU = v:
Proof. See Atkeson (1991) for details.
The Optimal Contract
We examine some properties of the optimal contract between the CG and the state. To
do this, we use the following two additional assumptions (see [2] for additional discussion).
Assumption 3: Assume that the value of repayments at the optimum is increasing in
investment for all µ0:
X
Y 0
d0(Y 0; µ0)(f0(Y 0) ¡ f1(Y 0)) ¸ 0
This amounts to an assumption that, at the constrained optimum, the lender would prefer
that the borrower make larger rather than smaller investments.
Assumption 4: Assume that the constrained optimal investment level is interior.
With these assumptions, the optimal incentive compatible level of investment I¤ is the
unique solution to the …rst order condition:
¡(1¡ ¯)u0(Q+ b¡ I) + ¯¸0(I) X
Y 0 ;µ0
v(Y 0 ¡ d0(Y 0; µ0); µ0)(f0(Y 0) ¡ f1(Y 0))¼(µ) = 0
14Since we are maximizing the payo¤ to the state, the individual rationality constraint is never binding in
this program.
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Given our assumptions we can replace (4) by with equality. Now, we may write our
programming program in terms of controls and the continuation value function as15 :
(P ¤) v(Q; µ) =max
A;Ud
f(1 ¡ ¯)u(Q+ ®µ + b¡ I) + ¯ X
Y 0 ;µ0
U(Y 0 ¡ d(Y 0; µ0); µ0)f(Y 0; I)¼(µ0)g
subject to
(10) g ¡ b+ I  Q+ ®µ
where g; I ¸ 0 and b¡ d  (1¡ ®)µ
(20)
¡b+ ¯
X
Q0;µ0
d0(Y 0; µ0)f(Y 0; I)¼(µ0) ¸ 0
and for all (Y 0; µ)
(30) U (Y 0 ¡ d(Y 0; µ0); µ0) ¸ USaut(Y 0; µ0)
(40) ¡(1¡¯)u0(Q+b¡I)+¯¸0(I)PY 0 ;µ0 U (Y 0¡d(Y 0; µ0); µ0)(f0(Y 0)¡f1(Y 0))¼(µ) = 0
(50) V (Y 0 ¡ d0(Y 0; µ0); µ0) ¸ U(Y 0 ¡ d(Y 0; µ0); µ0)
The following result follows by standard arguments since u is strictly increasing.
Result 3: v is strictly increasing in both arguments.
Finally, we de…ne the Lagrangian for the program (P ¤) in terms of controls and continu-
ation values, where the notation for the Lagrange multipliers is obvious (note that they were
15Note that (5’) is representing admissibility of the continuation value function since v is, by de…nition, the
supremum of V .
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already normalized).
L(A;Ud; ´) = (1¡ ¯)u(Q+ ®µ + b¡ I) + ¯
X
Y 0 ;µ0
U(Y 0 ¡ d(Y 0; µ0); µ0)f(Y 0; I)¼(µ0) +
+´1[¡b+ ¯
X
Q0 ;µ0
d0(Y 0; µ0)f (Y 0; I)¼(µ0)]
+¯
X
Y 0 ;µ0
´2(Y
0; µ0)f(Y 0; I)¼(µ0)[U(Y 0 ¡ d(Y 0; µ0); µ0)¡ USaut(Y 0; µ0)]
+´3[¡(1¡ ¯)u0(Q+ b ¡ I )¡ ¯¸0(I)
X
Y 0;µ0
U(Y 0 ¡ d(Y 0; µ0); µ0)(f0(Y 0) ¡ f1(Y 0))¼(µ)]
+¯
X
Y 0 ;µ0
´4(Y
0; µ0)f(Y 0; I)¼(µ0)[V (Y 0 ¡ d0(Y 0; µ0); µ0)¡ U(Y 0 ¡ d(Y 0; µ0); µ0)]
Consider the …rst order condition of this Lagrangian L with respect to the continuation
values U (Y 0 ¡ d(Y 0; µ0); µ0); that is given by
0 = ¯g(Y 0; I)¼(µ0) + ¯´2(Y
0; µ0)f(Y 0; I )¼(µ0)
+´3¯¸
0(I )¼(µ0)[f0(Y 0) ¡ g1(Y 0)]
¡¯´4(Y 0; µ0)f(Y 0; I )¼(µ0)
which can be rewritten as
1 + ´3¸
0(I)f1(Y 0)[f0(Y 0)=f1(Y 0) ¡ 1]=f(Y 0; I) = ´4(Y 0; µ0) ¡ ´2(Y 0; µ0)
Since all the multipliers are nonnegative, ´3 > 0 and the fact that fn(Y 0) > 0 for all
Y 0 2 -, then ´2(Y 0; µ0) > 0 whenever 1 + ´3¸0(I)[f0(Y 0) ¡ f1(Y 0)]=f(Y 0; I ) < 0. Thus, the
no repudiation constraint binds when ´3¸
0(I)[f0(Y 0) ¡ f1(Y 0)]=f (Y 0; I) is su¢ciently small.
Note that to get this result it is important that the state’s e¤ort (represented by investment)
has an important impact on the probabilities of getting high locally collected …scal resources.
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By assumption 2, the ratio f0(Y 0)=f1(Y 0) monotone increasing in Y 0, so that if it is
su¢ciently small for some Y 0, it is so for all lower realizations of Y 0. However, it cannot be
the case that this ratio is smaller than 1 for all Y since f0 and f1 are probability distributions.
Is important to notice that this property does not depend upon the next period’s realization
µ0: That is, the di¤erence ´4(Y
0; µ0)¡ ´2(Y 0; µ0) is in fact independent of µ0 (the left hand side
in the equality above depends only upon (Q; µ) and Y 0):
When the no repudiation constraint binds we have that, given that  2 [0; 1]; v(Y 0 ¡
d0(Y 0; µ0); µ0) = USaut(Y
0; µ0)  USaut(Y 0; µ0). Since the autarky allocation is always feasi-
ble, individually rational, immune to repudiation and incentive compatible, we have that
USaut(Y
0¡d0(Y 0; µ0); µ0)  USaut(Y 0; µ0) and thus d0(Y 0; µ0) ¸ 0 (with strict inequality if < 1).
Implementing the optimal contract with negotiation costs. Suppose that, a state says
”yes” to the contract proposed by the CG when it is getting in period 0 at least the autarky
expected utility level with local …scal resources Y0 ¡ !. If the state is not satis…ed with the
contract, the result of the negotiation process is just the autarky allocation.
Note then that if the realization of the economy at date 0 is Y 0 such that the no re-
pudiation constraint is binding, then whenever ! ¸ d0(Y 0; µ0) we will have that for all µ
USaut(Y
0; µ) > USaut(Y 0; µ) = v(Y 0¡d0(Y 0; µ); µ) ¸ v(Y 0¡!; µ). In this situation, the solution
to the problem will be ”autarky”. So we had established speci…c bounds to ! to identify
situations where the solution to the negotiation process is the autarky allocation with a CG
providing no insurance to a given state.
Also note that the no repudiation constraint binds, USaut(Y 0; µ) > USaut(Y 0; µ) = v(Y 0 ¡
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d0(Y 0; µ), what could be given a hint that there exist incentives to renegotiate. Of course,
this has not been formalized here.
4 Conclusions
We have discussed in this note that in economies with asymmetric information, incomplete
degree of enforceability and high negotiation costs it could be optimal to implement the
autarky allocation without providing any kind of insurance from the central government to
the state to avoid negotiation costs.
Basically, if state’s e¤ort has an important impact on the probabilities of getting high
…scal resources, then it could be the case that the optimal transfer mechanism, to give the
right incentives to the state, put the no repudiation constraint bind for some realizations of
the level of locally collected taxes. When deciding what kind of contract to negotiate at date
0, the state could optimally choose to get no insurance and solve the autarky problem. These
situation are more likely to emerge when the state starts negotiating with a low realization
of its resources and negotiation costs are present, but independently of nationally collected
taxes.
We should mention that this was, in some sense, a partial equilibrium approach since we
have considered only one state negotiating with the central government. One could think
that ”the state” is actually representing a set of states. However, the natural extension
would be to include any number of states; the easy conjecture is nevertheless that basic
results would still hold whenever the optimal transfer mechanism …nds situations where the
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no repudiation constraint is binding. It is clear that all these results crucially depend upon
the assumption that is ”technologically” given: if they could negotiate with respect to this,
then the analysis should be very di¤erent.
As alreadymentioned, we were assuming away the possibility that the CG could repudiate
any contract. However, this is a really strong assumption: we need to suppose that the federal
system can make the CG commit to a given contract and cannot completely do this with a
state. It would be interesting to analyze the possibility of having incomplete commitment
on this side too.
Finally, we were assuming that the state cannot negotiate any other kind of debt. This is
not a trivial assumption, in particular, when externalities with respect to risk premium paid
for any agent in the economy are considered (assuming that the elasticity for these funds
are …nite). It could be actually the case that borrowing constraints to the states are Pareto
improving.
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